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Abstract
In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. 
First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to 
show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood 
as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior 
to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments 
are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge 
of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are careful to keep separate the 
various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation 
of the fact that (e.g.,) Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult 
to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge 
of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral 
scepticism.
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1 For this formulation of the particularism-generalism debate, see Leibowitz (2009a). The list 
of options here mentioned is illustrative rather than exhaustive. The specific details of what 
an adequate particularist explanation consists of may vary from one particularist theory to 
another. See Leibowitz (2011).
2 See M&R (2006) Chapters 6 & 7.
1 Introduction
Particularists claim that moral phenomena can be explained without relying 
on exceptionless moral principles. The debate over particularism in recent 
years has focused on whether the rightness and wrongness of actions can be so 
explained: generalists claim that in order to explain the rightness of some 
action, A, we must identify a feature, F, of A and a principle according to which 
any action that has feature F is right (or pro tanto right). Particularists, in con-
trast, claim that an explanation of the rightness of A can be perfectly adequate 
without mention of exceptionless universal generalizations – perhaps ceteris 
paribus generalizations or generic statements will do, or perhaps the fact that 
A is F can explain A’s rightness without mention of generalizations at all.1
However, the rightness (wrongness) of actions is not the only moral 
phenomenon in need of explanation. The fact (if it is a fact) that some people 
have moral knowledge must also be explained. If, for instance, an adequate 
explanation of Jane’s knowledge that action A is right must mention an excep-
tionless moral principle, then the particularist project of providing an account 
of morality without relying on exceptionless moral principles will be gravely 
jeopardized. And indeed, the chief argument in Sean McKeever and Michael 
Ridge’s [henceforth M&R] book-length critique of particularism is centred on 
the explanation of moral knowledge. According to M&R a generalist, princi-
ple-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to 
obtain moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a partic-
ularist, non-principle-based account. And consequently, they claim, we have 
reason to abandon the particularist project.2
In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral 
knowledge. First, I consider M&R’s arguments in favour of a generalist account 
of practical wisdom and I explain why I find them unconvincing (§2). In §3 
I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral 
facts. I argue that when we are careful to keep separate the various explanatory 
tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation of the fact 
that (e.g.,) Jane knows that act A is morally right might not be so difficult to 
come by and I draw some of the implications of the kind of explanations I 
propose for moral epistemology more generally.
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3 See Dancy (2004) Chapters 2 & 3.
2 M&R’s Arguments
A person of practical wisdom can obtain moral knowledge in a wide range of 
situations. How does she do this? According to M&R the best explanation of 
practical wisdom is that “practical wisdom involves the internalization of a 
finite and manageable set of non-hedged moral principles which together 
codify all of morality” (139). Their thought is that a person of practical wisdom 
has at her disposal a set of exceptionless moral principles from which, together 
with empirical information about the non-moral features of various situations, 
she can deduce the normative status of actions. This is a generalist model 
because exceptionless moral principles play an indispensible role in the expla-
nation of the ability of the practically wise person to obtain moral knowledge. 
And this is the best explanation of practical wisdom, according to M&R, 
because unlike its particularist competitors it can accommodate two central 
features of practical wisdom: that practical wisdom extends to novel and 
unusual situations and that moral knowledge is not entirely a posterior. 
Consequently, inference to the best explanation leads to the conclusion that 
we have reason to endorse generalism and to abandon particularism.
To my mind, generalism does not have the explanatory advantages which 
M&R attribute to it. In order to see why, let us take a closer look at M&R’s 
arguments.
2.1 The Argument from Scope
M&R grant, for the sake of argument, Dancy’s holism in the theory of reasons. 
Holism is the view that a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason 
at all, or an opposite reason, in another case. Holists distinguish between 
features that are reasons (favourers) and features that operate on reasons, such 
as enablers, disablers, intensifiers, and attenuators.3 On this model, whether 
a feature is a reason in a particular situation depends on the presence 
(or absence) of enablers and disablers. Moreover, the contribution that each 
reason makes to the overall normative status of a particular action is influ-
enced by the presence (or absence) of intensifiers and attenuators. Let us call 
all these features—reasons, enablers, disablers, intensifiers and attenuators—
the morally relevant features of a situation. A practically wise person must be 
sensitive to all morally relevant features of a situation because if she is not so 
sensitive her ability to obtain moral knowledge in a wide range of situations 
would be utterly mysterious. Moreover, if there are morally relevant features to 
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4 One question that M&R do not address is how a person of practical wisdom knows that she 
is in a situation that calls for moral assessment in the first place. That is, how does she know 
when to run through her mental checklist of morally relevant features? It seems that even 
proponents of the checklist model must appeal to some skill or ability in their account of 
moral knowledge, otherwise they may have to resort to “checklists all the way down”.
5 If disablers and enablers can themselves be disabled or enabled, she also runs through a 
complete list of meta-disablers/enablers.
which she is not sensitive her claim to know the moral fact in question may be 
undermined or defeated.
According to M&R, the best explanation of the fact that a person of 
practical wisdom is sensitive to all the morally relevant features of a situation 
is that she knows in advance all the types of features that could possibly 
be relevant. “The best explanation of how a person of practical wisdom can 
reliably know what there is most reason to do,” M&R write,
will invoke the idea that she already knows all of the kinds of consider-
ations which can function as reasons, defeaters, enablers, intensifiers, 
and deminishers and indeed understands how they interact … The 
possibility of practical wisdom … is best explained by the hypothesis 
that the person of practical wisdom already knows and indeed can 
articulate all of the potential reasons, defeaters, etc. which might be in 
play. (142)
According to M&R a practically wise person has a “mental checklist” of all 
potential moral reasons. She runs through this checklist to determine whether 
any of the items on her list are present.4 Next, she must find out whether 
any of the candidate reasons that are present are disabled or enabled. So she 
runs through a complete list of potential disablers and enablers.5 Then she 
checks whether any item on her intensifiers/attenuators list is present. 
After running through all these lists she will be able to form an accurate 
judgment about which reasons are “active” in this specific situation and 
how “weighty” each reason is. Finally, she identifies an exceptionless principle 
that tells her how these reasons, given their various weights, balance out, 
and she uses this principle to deduce the normative status of the action 
in question. On M&R’s view, then, the fact that a person of practical wisdom 
knows the normative status of an action is explained by her ability to deduce 
it from an exceptionless principle. Hence, in order to explain Jane’s knowledge 
of the normative status of A we must appeal to an exceptionless moral 
principle.
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6 In his latest book (2004:142–3) Dancy expresses a similar position. He claims that moral 
knowledge is “more like knowledge-how than like knowledge-that” and that moral knowl-
edge is obtained by the application of a skill of discernment.
7 There may be reasons to think that particular moral judgments are not acquired in this way. 
See, for example, Dworkin (1995) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1990) as well as various sources 
cited in M&R (2006) ch. 9 section 4.
That the checklist model is the best explanation of practical wisdom is, of 
course, a comparative claim. The particularist alternative M&R consider is one 
offered by Jonathan Dancy:
Our account of the person on whom we can rely to make sound moral 
judgements is not very long. Such a person is someone who gets it right 
case by case. To be consistently successful, we need a broad range of sen-
sitivities, so that no relevant feature escapes us, and we do not mistake its 
relevance either. But that is all there is to say on the matter. (1993:64)6
According to M&R the checklist model is superior to Dancy’s sensitivity model 
because it explains the scope of practical wisdom: practical wisdom, M&R 
maintain, should extend to novel and unusual situations. M&R invite us to 
imagine Wanda, a person of practical wisdom who visits an entirely alien 
culture. They claim that since Wanda is a person of practical wisdom, if she has 
access to all non-moral facts about this alien culture she should be able to 
determine the normative status of actions and practices there. M&R’s checklist 
model can explain this: since Wanda knows in advance all the morally relevant 
features and moral principles, her ability to know the normative status of 
actions depends exclusively on having access to non-moral facts.
Whether this proposed explanation of the scope of practical wisdom gives 
us a reason to favour generalism over particularism depends on three consider-
ations: (a) the plausibility of the explanans—namely, the checklist model; (b) 
the plausibility of competing particularist explanations; and (c) our confidence 
in the truth of the explanandum: if practical wisdom doesn’t extend in the way 
M&R claim it does then the “explanation” of this alleged feature of practical 
wisdom will not help us to adjudicate between particularism and generalism.
Let us first assess the plausibility of the checklist model. The thesis under 
discussion seems to be a thesis about the cognitive process by which a person 
of practical wisdom obtains moral knowledge. If so, whether, in fact, a person 
of practical wisdom runs through mental checklists of morally relevant fea-
tures and performs an explicit mental deduction is not a question that can be 
answered from the philosopher’s armchair.7 The only argument we have been 
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8 In personal correspondence McKeever pointed out to me that he is happy to allow that moral 
knowledge is interpersonally transferable (e.g., by testimony) and so that there are other 
methods for the acquisition of moral knowledge other than the checklist model. The qualifi-
cation “direct” or “basic” moral knowledge in the text is added in order to emphasize that the 
focus here is on moral knowledge which does not depend on there being other agents who 
possess moral knowledge. In any case, particularists are unlikely to accept the claim that 
unless one is practically wise one can obtain moral knowledge only indirectly.
given in support of this model is that it best explains the extended scope of 
practical wisdom. But those of us who are not practically wise cannot obtain 
moral knowledge by utilizing the same process that a practically wise person 
employs because we do not know in advance all the potential morally relevant 
features and exceptionless moral principles. So either we can obtain moral 
knowledge in some other way, in which case there is some other explanation of 
how moral knowledge is acquired, or we cannot obtain moral knowledge at all. 
If there is another way by which moral knowledge can be obtained, then we 
may wonder whether the checklist account is a better explanation of practical 
wisdom than the following hypothesis: The difference between us and practi-
cally wise people is not that we acquire moral knowledge by using different 
cognitive processes, but rather that practically wise people use the same  
processes we do but they simply use them better.
M&R may insist that only people of practical wisdom have direct (or basic) 
moral knowledge. But first, this seems to undermine the dialectical force of 
their argument, which is supposed to start from a premise that both particular-
ists and generalists accept. Particularists are unlikely to accept the claim that 
only people who know all morally relevant properties and moral principles can 
have moral knowledge.8 Second, and more importantly, on the view under 
discussion moral knowledge is an “all or nothing” business. Either one knows 
all the morally relevant features and moral principles or one cannot obtain 
(direct) moral knowledge at all. According to the model under discussion, one 
must deduce one’s judgment from an exceptionless principle and the morally 
relevant features that are present. In order to obtain knowledge in this way one 
must correctly identify all the features that are present and the moral principle 
that applies to the situation at hand. If one uses the wrong principle it seems 
that one’s judgment would not qualify as knowledge. And even if one selects a 
correct principle, if one is systematically blind to certain morally relevant fea-
tures then one’s identification of the correct principle might not be sufficiently 
sensitive to warrant an attribution of knowledge. This is because even if the 
principle in question had not been the correct principle to use in the situation 
due to the presence of additional morally relevant features to which the agent 
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9 The implausibility of the checklist model becomes apparent if we consider how we know 
that an act is dangerous (for example). It seems implausible to insist that in order to know 
that an act is dangerous one must know in advance all possible danger-relevant features 
(including enablers, disablers, intensifiers and attenuators) as well as the exceptionless prin-
ciple from which one can deduce that an act is dangerous.
is blind, the agent would still have believed that this is the correct principle to 
use. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a plausible account of moral education 
and moral development that accommodates this “all or nothing” aspect of 
knowledge of moral facts.9
Now let us compare M&R’s explanation to an alternative particularist story. 
According to one particularist model a person of practical wisdom obtains 
moral knowledge by exercising a skill of discernment. It may, therefore, be use-
ful to consider the scope of other skills by way of comparison. For example, 
consider a skilled off-road motorcyclist. Let us suppose that she acquired her 
skill by riding in certain kinds of terrain. If she is a skilled rider, though, we 
should expect that she will have no difficulty riding in a slightly different 
terrain from that with which she is experienced. Moreover, we may expect that 
she will do better than unskilled bikers in unusual and unfamiliar terrain—
perhaps we can expect her learning curve to be steeper in new environments. 
So to the extent that we have a handle on the notion of a skill, and to the extent 
that we can make sense of the acquisition of moral knowledge by the applica-
tion of a skill, we should expect this skill to extend to new and even to some-
what unusual situations.
M&R insist that if Wanda is practically wise, she should be able to obtain 
moral knowledge in an alien environment. If this alien environment is suffi-
ciently similar to ours then we should expect Wanda’s skill of discernment 
to carry over to this new environment. But what if the new environment 
is radically different? Presumably Wanda managed to acquire a skill that 
allows her to obtain moral knowledge in our normal environment. Perhaps 
we have reason to expect that given enough time and information Wanda 
would be able to acquire another skill—the skill required for the attainment 
of moral knowledge in this alien environment. Admittedly, Wanda will need 
more than just time and information to acquire this new skill—she will 
also need practice. But is it true that a comprehensive list of empirical facts is 
all one needs in order to obtain moral knowledge in an alien environment? 
Suppose that Wanda has access to a super-computer which can tell her the 
locations and properties of all the fundamental particles at any given time 
in this alien world. Are we supposed to expect her to be able to know the 
normative statuses of actions simply by consulting this computer? Is her 
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10 Schroeder (2009) raises similar concerns about M&R’s expectations about the scope of 
practical wisdom.
11 Thanks to Pekka Väyrynen for this proposal.
ability, so understood, anything like what we might recognize as practical 
wisdom?10
Even one who shares M&R’s intuitions about knowledge in alien environ-
ments may admit that these intuitions can hardly be used as explanatory 
desiderata that any adequate theory of practical wisdom must accommodate. 
Consider, for instance, Wendy, whose moral judgments are extremely reliable 
in our normal environment and also in different, but similar, environments. 
Let us assume that in such environments Wendy’s judgments are as reliable as 
Wanda’s judgments and that she can justify her judgments as well as Wanda 
can. However, unlike Wanda, Wendy is unable to form any moral judgment in 
radically alien environments. It is far from obvious that we must conclude that 
Wendy is not practically wise. And consequently, it is not clear that a particu-
larist account of practical wisdom that can explain Wendy’s, but not Wanda’s, 
abilities is not an account of practical wisdom.
So far, I’ve been treating M&R’s checklist model as a hypothesis about the 
psychological process by which a person of practical wisdom obtains moral 
knowledge. However, several features of M&R’s work suggest that we ought not 
to attribute this view to them. First, one might expect that if M&R wanted to 
establish an empirical thesis about actual psychological processes they would 
have provided some empirical evidence in support of their thesis. It would 
be quite remarkable if we could identify the psychological process by which 
moral knowledge is obtained simply by reflecting on the possibility of practical 
wisdom. Second, in the final chapter of their book M&R claim that their prin-
cipled conception of morality—”generalism as a regulative ideal”—is compat-
ible with both prototype theory and exemplar theory. These theories purport 
to explain how people classify particulars as falling under a certain concept. 
The classification process on both theories is very different from M&R’s check-
list account. Indeed, the checklist model, understood as a psychological thesis 
about the process by which moral knowledge is obtained, seems incompatible 
with prototype and exemplar accounts. Perhaps, then, a more charitable read-
ing of M&R is to interpret the checklist model as a “rational reconstruction” of 
the process by which a person of practical wisdom obtains moral knowledge 
rather than as the claim that a person of practical wisdom consciously uses the 
checklist model to reach moral judgments.11
While there is a great deal of disagreement over adequacy conditions for 
explanation, there is a fairly broad consensus that one necessary condition is 
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12 I owe this suggestion to Pekka Väyrynen and Daniel Elstein.
that the explanans must be true. If so, the checklist model cannot explain 
moral knowledge unless it is true. Perhaps, then, the thought is that something 
like the checklist model operates at the sub-personal level. However, relocating 
the checklist process to the sub-personal level is incompatible with M&R’s 
insistence that the person of practical wisdom “already knows and indeed can 
articulate all of the potential reasons, defeaters, etc. which might be in play”, 
and it undermines the arguments for generalism we have been discussing. 
Moreover, it is not quite clear to me how to make sense of the checklist model 
at the sub-personal level. At best, it might be viewed as a highly metaphorical 
description of a sub-personal psychological process. Finally, it is no less sur-
prising that we could discover the functioning of sub-personal processes 
merely by reflecting on the possibility of practical wisdom without doing any 
empirical research, than that we could discover the functioning of psychologi-
cal processes at the personal level in this way.
It may be tempting to view the checklist model as one extreme on a spec-
trum of models of the attainment of moral knowledge, where the skill model 
occupies the other extreme. Viewed in this way we can imagine a range of “in 
between” views. Rather than interpreting M&R as advocating the checklist 
model per se, we can, perhaps, interpret them as recommending a model 
closer to the checklist-model-end, as it were.12 While read in this way M&R’s 
proposal becomes somewhat more palatable, it is not clear that anything 
weaker than the extreme checklist model can be used as an argument against 
particularism. To undermine particularism M&R must identify moral phe-
nomena that cannot be explained without relying on exceptionless moral 
principles. Any model that is weaker than the extreme checklist model must 
allow for explanations without exceptionless principles and hence it will be 
compatible with particularism. So while moving away from the checklist-
extreme increases the plausibility of M&R’s model, it renders the debate over a 
weakened checklist model tangential to the particularism-generalist debate.
One may certainly feel that the skill-based account of practical wisdom that 
we are considering is underdeveloped. Furthermore, one may have doubts as 
to whether such an account can be fleshed out and expanded into a fully 
fledged plausible theory about how moral knowledge is obtained. Yet M&R’s 
objection is not that the checklist model is well-developed while the particu-
larist model is not. Instead they claim that there are moral phenomena that the 
checklist model explains and particularist models cannot explain. I hope to 
have shown that with respect to the phenomena considered in this section, a 
particularist explanation is no worse than a generalist checklist explanation. 
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13 This model makes knowledge of principles prior to, and more fundamental than, knowl-
edge of the normative status of particular actions. It is difficult to see how this model 
could accommodate the practice of revising principles in response to judgments about 
cases—a practice that M&R want to preserve (see, e.g., p. 158. But see Kagan (2001) for the 
view that judgments about cases do not generate data for moral theorizing.) Moreover, 
Indeed, given the implausibility of the checklist model and the lack of empiri-
cal evidence to support it, the particularist account, thin as it is, seems to offer 
a more promising approach to a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena we 
have been considering.
2.2 Moral Knowledge and the a Priori
How does a person of practical wisdom know a particular moral fact, e.g., that 
this action is right, or that in this case feature F is a reason to do action A? 
Presumably, a particular moral fact is a contingent fact—that a particular act 
is right depends on various contingent features of the action. For example, act 
A might be right because it brings about a lot of pleasure but that it does so is 
a contingent matter. Moreover, for holists, that the pleasure an action brings 
about is a right-making feature is also contingent. This suggests that knowl-
edge of particular moral facts is a posteriori knowledge. But it may seem 
implausible to hold that knowledge that a particular act is right is entirely 
a posteriori because the rightness of an action, one might think, is not some-
thing that can be discovered by way of a purely empirical investigation.
Archparticularist Jonathan Dancy takes this challenge very seriously. 
In response he argues that although particular moral facts are, indeed, contin-
gent they are, nevertheless, known a priori (2004, Ch. 8). M&R criticize Dancy’s 
position at length. It is an advantage of their favoured model, they argue, that 
it need not appeal to the mysterious category of the contingent a priori. On the 
view M&R favour we can have a priori knowledge of necessary exceptionless 
moral principles with purely descriptive antecedents. Knowledge of particular 
moral facts is gained by deduction from such a priori principles and a posteriori 
knowledge that their antecedents are (contingently) instantiated. For exam-
ple, we know that act A is wrong because we know a posteriori that A (contin-
gently) has feature F, and we know a priori that (necessarily) any act that has 
feature F is wrong. Thus, on the assumption that the person of practical wis-
dom internalizes a set of exceptionless moral principles we can explain the 
possibility of practical wisdom without attributing to her the curious ability to 
know a priori that a contingent fact obtains. So, the thought goes, exception-
less moral principles are essential for an adequate explanation of the possibil-
ity of moral knowledge and practical wisdom.13
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I suspect that if M&R’s argument succeeds it should be equally forceful against any form 
of pluralism. So its conclusion seems to be stronger than M&R recognize.
14 “Tigers have tails” is a paradigmatic example of a generic statement. “Tigers have tails” is 
true even though some tigers have no tails. The term “normic-statement” is introduced by 
Michael Scriven (1959) for statements that are not analytic and not refutable by a few 
counter instances. “The normic statement,” he writes, “says that everything falls into a 
certain category except those to which certain special conditions apply. And, although the 
normic statement itself does not explicitly list what count as exceptional conditions, it 
employs a vocabulary which reminds us of our knowledge of this, our trained judgment 
of exceptions” (1959:466).
15 Indeed, it is not so difficult to come up with scenarios in which it is anything but obvious 
that keeping a promise is right making. In contrast, it is much harder, and arguably impos-
sible, to find examples that show that keeping a promise is not normally right making.
16 See, e.g., Huemer (2007).
17 M&R take Moore’s Open Question Argument to show that moral predicates cannot be 
analyzed into purely descriptive language and so that moral principles are not analytic. 
See M&R’s Ch. 5 (and esp. section 5.2).
As M&R see it, the only two alternatives to the model they favour are Dancy’s 
“contingent a priori” and a purely a posteriori account of moral knowledge. 
And since both these options are unattractive, we have reason to forgo particu-
larism. I agree with M&R that both alternatives are not without difficulties; 
I find their critique of Dancy’s “contingent-a priori” compelling and there 
are familiar worries about a purely a posteriori account of moral knowledge. 
However, I believe that there are at least two other options open to 
particularists.
One option is that we can have a priori knowledge of exception-full or defea-
sible principles. Perhaps statements like “lying is wrong-making” and “pleasure 
is right-making”, understood as generic- or normic-statements,14 are both 
exception-full and knowable a priori. One might appeal to Ross-style self- 
evidence and argue that “normic statements” are self-evident. That keeping a 
promise is (normally) right-making is as plausible a candidate for self-evidence 
as Ross’ claim that keeping a promise is prima facie right.15 Alternatively, one 
could argue that normic statements seem right and make use of the principle 
of phenomenal conservatism.16 While normic statements cannot be used to 
deduce the normative status of particular actions, they may be a part of a 
proper explanation of particular judgments. In order to decide whether 
normic statements are knowable a priori we will need a detailed account of 
a priority which I am not prepared to give here. Yet by M&R’s standards we 
must not rule out the possibility that such statements are knowable a priori 
simply because they are not analytic.17
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18 See, for example, Zangwill (2006).
19 Dancy explicitly states that he intends particularism to be compatible with (ST). 
See Dancy (2004:85–93). For a discussion of the compatibility of (ST) with particularism, 
see Leibowitz (2009a).
20 I am assuming for the sake of discussion that nihilism is false. This is common ground in 
the context of the particularism-generalism debate.
21 Thanks to Carrie Jenkins for pressing me on this issue.
Another alternative is this. It is commonly thought that moral properties 
(globally) supervene on non-moral properties. Let us call this thesis the 
Supervenience Thesis or (ST). Moreover, it is plausible that if (ST) is knowable, 
it is knowable a priori.18 Particularists need not deny (ST), nor must they deny 
that (ST) is knowable a priori.19 (ST) guarantees that there are necessary 
connections between certain non-moral properties and moral properties. So 
particularists admit that there are true necessary statements of the form: (ST1) 
□∀x(Gx → Mx) where x ranges over actions, G is a non-moral property of 
being in a specific completely defined world-state and M is a moral property.20 
Statements like this are certainly not analytic on any plausible construal of 
analyticity, but by M&R’s standards this doesn’t entail that they are not know-
able a priori. So perhaps statements of this kind might serve as the a priori 
element, as we have been calling it, that M&R insist any account of moral 
knowledge must identify.
One might think that (ST1) is a moral principle and so that by identifying the 
a priori element of moral knowledge in the form of (ST1), I have, in effect, given 
up on the particularist project. But this would be a mistake. I presented the 
debate between particularists and generalists as a disagreement over whether 
exceptionless principles are essential for an adequate explanation of moral 
phenomena. Suppose we want to explain the rightness of some action, A. I take 
it that on any plausible theory of explanation the following statement would 
not qualify as an adequate explanation: action A is right because any action that 
instantiates the property of being-in-a-world-state-indistinguishable-from-
this-one is morally right. Statements like (SP1) do not explain the rightness 
(wrongness) of actions and so these are not generalizations of the kind that 
generalists claim, and particularists deny, are essential to moral theorizing.
One may worry that to identify the a priori element of moral knowledge in 
the form of (ST1) doesn’t solve the problem with which we began. The chal-
lenge was to identify the a priori component of our knowledge of particular 
moral facts. But surely we cannot use generalizations like (ST1) to deduce  
the normative status of particular actions. So the problem with which we 
started remains unsolved.21 Now if the challenge is to indentify an a priori  
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element that we, in fact, know and can use to deduce particular moral 
judgments that constitute moral knowledge, then I agree that the challenge 
has not been met. But we should keep in mind that M&R have not met 
this challenge either since they have not identified exceptionless moral 
principles that we know and can use in this way. So insofar as we must identify 
a known a priori element, particularists and generalists are on a par. Both 
particularists and generalists must appeal to features that are in principle 
knowable a priori. So, I conclude, whatever role the identification of an 
a priori element is supposed to fulfil in the explanation of knowledge of 
particular moral facts, if M&R’s principles can do it, then it’s not clear why 
(ST1) could not.
3 Explaining Knowledge of Particular Moral Facts
So far I have argued that M&R’s arguments—arguments that purport to iden-
tify phenomena that the checklist, principle-based model of moral knowledge 
explains better than a particularist skill-based model—are unconvincing. 
In this section I argue that particularist-friendly explanations of knowledge of 
particular moral facts are, in fact, not so difficult to come by—as long as we 
identify properly what it is that we are trying to explain.
The task of explaining knowledge of particular moral facts can be under-
stood in several ways. One thing that we might wish to explain is the very 
possibility of moral knowledge. This task can be described as an attempt to 
answer the question whether, and if so how, knowledge of particular moral 
facts is possible. Alternatively, we may wish to explain particular instances of 
moral knowledge. This task can be described as an attempt to answer ques-
tions like this: How does Jane know that action A is morally right?
It may be useful to compare the explanation of knowledge of particular 
moral facts to the explanation of knowledge of other people’s mental states. 
Here, too, there are two possible explanatory tasks. One thing we might wish to 
explain is the very possibility of knowledge of other people’s mental states. 
This task can be described as an attempt to answer the question whether, and 
if so how, such knowledge is possible. Another separate goal might be to 
explain particular instances of knowledge of other people’s mental states. 
This task can be described as an attempt to answer questions like this: How 
does John know that Jim is distressed?
Explaining the very possibility of knowledge of other people’s mental states 
is notoriously difficult. However, coming up with possible explanations of par-
ticular instances of knowledge of other people’s mental states is simple enough. 
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22 This list isn’t exhaustive – there may well be other kinds of explanations one could offer.
For example, consider the following answers to the question ‘How does John 
know that Jim is distressed?’:
a) John knows that Jim received some disturbing news.
b) John noticed that Jim is restless and out of focus.
c) John is a very sensitive person.
d) John was told so by Bill who is extremely reliable about such matters.
In “normal” contexts, I submit, answers like these are perfectly felicitous 
and they constitute adequate explanations of John’s knowledge of Jim’s 
distress.22 Indeed, if explanations like these are inadequate, we may be forced 
to conclude that John’s knowledge that Jim is distressed is inexplicable. 
The fact that we are typically not perplexed by claims like ‘John knows that 
Jim is distressed’ and our ability in ordinary contexts to offer acceptable expla-
nations for such claims militate against the hypothesis that such claims are 
inexplicable.
Several aspects of these proposed explanations are worth emphasizing. 
First, none of them, nor their conjunction, guarantees that John knows that 
Jim is distressed. Moreover, there are no known exceptionless principles that 
we can add to these proposed explanations, or that we can reasonably expect 
John to know, that would guarantee that John knows that Jim is distressed. 
Second, if the mental supervenes on the physical, then there are some physical 
features that determine Jim’s distress. Presumably, if John knows that Jim is 
distressed he must, in some sense, be sensitive to these features. Nevertheless, 
John need not be able to articulate these features in order to know that Jim is 
distressed. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a (non-fanciful) context in which 
these features would partake in a proper explanation of John’s knowledge. 
Third, the explanandum we are after is that John knows that Jim is distressed, 
or schematically, that S knows that p (henceforth, ‘KSp’). An adequate explana-
tion of p need not explain KSp and an adequate explanation of KSp need not 
explain p. For example, while in some contexts Jim’s brain-state may explain 
Jim’s distress, in non-fanciful contexts Jim’s brain state does not explain John’s 
knowledge of Jim’s distress. Likewise, while the proposed explanations (a)-(d) 
above may explain John’s knowledge they do not explain the fact that Jim is 
distressed. (a) is different from (b)-(d) because (a) entails that Jim received 
some disturbing news which, in turn, may explain Jim’s distress. This suggests 
that perhaps one explanation of KSp is that S knows something that explains p. 
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But as the other proposed explanations indicate this is not the only way to 
explain KSp.
Returning to moral knowledge, explaining the very possibility of moral 
knowledge, like explaining the very possibility of knowledge of other minds, 
is a daunting task. In contrast, explanations of knowledge of particular moral 
facts are widespread and mundane, and it is quite easy to come up with poten-
tial answers to questions like ‘How does Jane know that act A is right?’:
e) Jane knows that act A is a compassionate act.
f) Jane examined the situation carefully, she understands what is at stake, 
she is sufficiently disinterested (or involved), she has been in a situation 
like this before (etc.)
g) Jane is a very sensitive (or caring, or responsible) person.
h) Jane was told so by Berta who is extremely reliable about such matters.
In “normal” contexts answers like these are perfectly felicitous and they consti-
tute adequate explanations of Jane’s knowledge of the rightness of A. As in our 
previous example, if explanations like these are inadequate, we may have to 
conclude that the fact that Jane knows that A is morally right is inexplicable. 
That we are not typically perplexed by attributions of moral knowledge 
together with the availability of acceptable explanations suggests that the 
inexplicability hypothesis is no more palatable in the moral case than it is in 
the case of other minds.
In the moral case, like the mental case, the proposed explanans does not 
necessitate the explanandum. Although the moral supervenes on the non-
moral, the set of properties on which the rightness of A supervenes need not 
be included in a proper explanation of Jane’s knowledge that A is morally right. 
Moreover, since we typically do not know what the subvenient base is, it is bet-
ter to explain Jane’s knowledge of the rightness of A without attributing to her 
extraordinary knowledge of this kind. While (e)-(h) may explain the fact that 
Jane knows that A is right, they do not explain the rightness of A. Unlike (f)-(h), 
however, (e) entails that A is a compassionate act which, in turn, may explain 
the rightness of A. This suggests that perhaps one kind of explanation of Jane’s 
knowledge that A is morally right is that Jane knows something that explains 
the rightness of A. But as (f)-(e) indicate, this is not the only way to explain 
Jane’s knowledge.
There are, of course, important differences between the relation of the men-
tal to the physical and the relation of the moral to the non-moral. For example, 
the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral is (arguably) knowable 
a priori, whereas the supervenience of the mental on the physical is (arguably) 
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23 See, for example, Zangwill (2006).
24 I develop this version of a particularist-friendly explanation of the rightness of actions in 
Leibowitz (2012). I will say more about it below.
not knowable a priori.23 Also, (b) above—that John noticed that Jim is restless 
and out of focus—explains Jim’s distress because (arguably) Jim’s distress 
causes his restless behaviour. However, in the moral case it is not clear that the 
rightness of A causes anything. If moral properties are causally inert, then one 
cannot explain knowledge of such properties by knowledge of their causal 
consequences. These differences show that the analogy between the two cases 
discussed earlier can only go so far. But perhaps as far as it goes is far enough—
some kinds of explanations seem to be applicable in both the moral case and 
the mental case.
Let us focus on the explanation of KSp that takes the form that S knows 
something that explains p—that is, explanations of the kind illustrated by (a) 
and (e) above. If, as I suggested, the fact that S knows something that explains 
p can (at least sometimes) explain KSp, then pace M&R, explaining knowledge 
of particular moral facts doesn’t pose a new challenge for particularism. If par-
ticularists succeed in demonstrating that we can explain the rightness and 
wrongness of actions without appealing to exceptionless moral principles, 
then what S knows when S knows something that explains p need not include 
knowledge of exceptionless moral principles. For example, if one can ade-
quately explain the rightness of an act A—say an act of making a charitable 
donation to a worthy cause—by citing the fact that in doing A the agent of 
A was neither stingy nor extravagant, without the further commitment that all 
actions that are neither stingy nor extravagant are right (or even pro tanto 
right),24 then the fact that Jane knows that in doing A the agent of A was nei-
ther stingy nor extravagant may explain her knowledge that A is right without 
relying on or presupposing the availability of any exceptionless moral 
principles.
It may seem tempting to argue that the kinds of explanations I propose are 
felicitous but incomplete. The proposed explanans provide some pertinent 
information about the explanandum but they succeed as explanations only 
because they rely on listeners to fill in the gaps. For example, that Jane’s knowl-
edge that act A is compassionate is a felicitous explanation of her knowledge 
that A is right, is a pragmatic phenomenon—in normal conversational con-
texts we can make use of information that remains unstated. In claiming that 
this explanation is adequate, however, we are helping ourselves to this unstated 
information. But this information, though unstated, is still a proper part of 
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25 Thanks to Sydney Penner for pressing me on this point.
26 For a more detailed discussion of this issue as well as an argument for why a Hempel-style 
move to “explanation sketches” won’t do, see Leibowitz (2011).
27 See Leibowitz (2011).
the explanation. And so the explanations, felicitous or not, are literally 
inadequate.25
It is certainly plausible that the explanations I proposed make use of 
information that remains unstated. Indeed, one could expand on these 
explanations in various ways. However, it seems implausible to suppose that 
these explanations are felicitous only because we can rely on the hearer to 
complete them by adding exceptionless principles that link the stated explan-
ans to the desired explanandum – at present no such principles are known. 
One condition of adequacy for a theory of explanation is that some “explana-
tions” are adequate explanations. We may, therefore, have reason to be scepti-
cal of theories of explanation according to which felicitous “explanations” are 
irrevocably inadequate.26
But if, as I claim, explanations of moral knowledge are so readily available, 
why have philosophers been so puzzled by knowledge of particular moral 
facts? And why have explanations of the kinds I proposed been largely over-
looked by philosophers?
One reason, I suspect, is that many ethicists still endorse, either explicitly 
or implicitly, a deductive model of explanation according to which in order 
to properly explain something one must identify features from which the 
explanandum can be deduced. The explanations offered above are not 
deductive—the explanans does not guarantee the explanandum—and so they 
may have been quickly dismissed because they have been thought to flagrantly 
fail a basic condition of adequacy for a proper explanation of the phenomena 
in question. However, a careful examination of the nature of explanation 
reveals that adequate explanations need not take the form of a deductive argu-
ment.27 Consequently, that the explanations offered above are non-deductive 
is not, in itself, a reason to discard them.
Another related reason why these explanations have not been considered 
concerns the type of generalizations on which they rely. When we seek to 
explain knowledge of particular moral facts we may expect that our explana-
tion will tell us at once something informative about all instances of moral 
knowledge. This expectation parallels a similar expectation regarding explana-
tions of the rightness of actions—namely, that an adequate explanation of the 
rightness of actions will tell us at once something informative about all right 
actions. Particularists, however, insist that this expectation is unwarranted. 
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28 The precise details of the particularist explanation of the rightness of actions may vary 
from one particularist theory to another. The explanation, or “explanation-sketch”, I sug-
gest in the main text is based on the particularist theory I develop in Leibowitz (2012).
It may well be the case that the only true general claims we can make about all 
right actions will be in the form of uninformative trivialities like the following: 
right actions lie in the mean—they are neither excessive nor deficient—and 
they are performed at the right times, with reference to the right objects, 
towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way. Statements 
like this do not provide illuminating information about all right actions—they 
look more like tautologies or vacuous trivialities—and nothing of interest 
follows from them. However, there are other ways to understand the explana-
tory role of such statements. Instead of major premises in syllogisms from 
which the normative status of particular actions can be inferred, we can think 
of such statements as summaries of, or placeholders for, specific informative 
explanations. That is, such statements can be viewed as explanatory schemas 
that provide information about the structure of proper explanations and the 
kind of information that such explanations ought to include: to explain the 
rightness of a particular action we must identify a scale on which the action is 
neither excessive nor deficient and we must “discharge the hedges”—i.e., the 
right time, the right object, etc.28
Returning to explanations of knowledge of particular moral facts: perhaps 
the only true general claims we can make about all instances of moral knowl-
edge will be trivialities like the following: all such cases are cases in which the 
agent gets it right. This, too, looks much like a tautology or a vacuous triviality 
and nothing of interest follows from generalizations of this kind. Thus, if such 
generalizations explain anything, they cannot do so by functioning as major 
premises in syllogisms. Their explanatory role is better viewed as explanatory 
schemas that tell us something about the kind of information that explana-
tions of knowledge of particular moral facts ought to include. All cases of 
moral knowledge are cases in which the agent gets it right. Sometimes she gets 
it right because she knows that in doing A the agent of A was neither stingy nor 
extravagant. Sometimes she gets it right because she knows that in doing A the 
agent of A was neither fearful nor overconfident. And sometimes she gets it 
right because she knows that A is a compassionate action. These explanations 
are not derivable from the general statement about getting it right. Instead they 
give this general statement its substance and content. Indeed, general state-
ments about getting it right will not be a part of a proper explanation of knowl-
edge of the rightness and wrongness of particular action at all. So a proper 
explanation of Jane’s knowledge that A is right might be that Jane knows that 
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29 One explicit expression of this expectation can be found in Ladd (1952:499), where Ladd 
insists that proper explanations “should provide us with statements that have ‘potential 
predictive force’”.
30 At least not directly. They may be helpful in other ways. See Leibowitz (2012).
31 For a discussion of the distinction between explaining the rightness of actions and 
providing decision procedures see Leibowitz (2009b).
A is neither excessive nor deficient and that A was performed at the right time, 
with reference to the right object, etc.,—when the generic features of this 
explanatory schema are replaced properly with Jane’s knowledge of specific 
features of the case at hand.
A third reason why the kinds of explanations I suggested have not been 
considered concerns the aim of giving such explanations. It may be tempting 
to think that one aim of the project of explaining moral knowledge is to 
help us figure out what we need to do in order to obtain moral knowledge. 
The explanation offered by M&R seems to achieve this objective – if we want 
to obtain moral knowledge we need to internalize a set of exceptionless moral 
principles from which, together with some empirical information, we will be 
able to deduce the rightness or wrongness of individual action. Since a com-
plete explanation of Jane’s knowledge that action A is right will mention the 
principle from which Jane deduced the rightness of A, then once we have this 
explanation we will be in a position to obtain moral knowledge ourselves.29 
That is, if in order to explain KSp we need to indentify conditions such that 
whenever they obtain then S knows that p, then any explanation can be used 
to predict that if these conditions obtain one will know that p. And so, one way 
to know that p, is to make sure that the relevant conditions obtain.
In contrast, the explanations I proposed cannot help us to figure out what 
we need to do in order to obtain knowledge of particular moral facts.30 Jane 
can know that A is a compassionate action or that A is neither stingy nor 
extravagant and still not know that A is right. For one thing Jane might not 
believe that A is right. What’s more, Jane might know these things about A and 
yet A might not be right. So it may seem as though the explanations offered 
here have no ‘potential predictive force’ and hence that they are inadequate.
This line of reasoning is, to my mind, unpersuasive. First, there is no reason 
to insist that an adequate explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts 
should be useful in or applicable for obtaining moral knowledge. It is construc-
tive, here, to attend to a common distinction in normative ethics between 
explaining the rightness of actions and providing a practicable decision proce-
dure.31 Utilitarians, for example, are quick to point out that even if one could 
show that one cannot use the principle of utility to determine what one ought 
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to do, it may still be the correct explanation of the rightness/wrongness 
of actions.32 A similar distinction may be expedient in moral epistemology. 
It is one thing to explain moral knowledge and it is another thing to offer 
advice on how to obtain moral knowledge. Hence, that an explanation of 
moral knowledge doesn’t provide us with practicable advice on how to obtain 
moral knowledge is no objection to the proposed explanation qua explanation 
of moral knowledge.
Second, an examination of work on the nature of explanation shows 
that the “explanation-prediction symmetry thesis”, as we may call it, is not a 
constraint on explanation that one must accept. Indeed, on all but the classic 
D-N model of explanation this constraint is abandoned. As Scriven observed in 
1959, “we have more data for explaining than we did for predicting” (469) 
because when we set out to explain p we are not asking whether p but rather 
we can use p as part of the data we have at our disposal.
A fourth reason why the kinds of explanations I proposed have not generally 
been considered is this: even after being presented with these explanations 
one might still be puzzled about moral knowledge. For example, one who 
thinks that moral properties are causally inert, non-natural properties, may 
still puzzle over how we could know whether, where, or when such properties 
are instantiated.
Here it is important to pay attention to what it is we have been trying to 
explain. Earlier we identified two explanatory tasks: explaining the possibility 
of moral knowledge and explaining knowledge of particular moral facts, and 
we said that we will focus on the latter task. With this in mind we can see that 
the resistance considered here to the explanations I proposed is based on a 
conflation of the two explanatory tasks – it is no objection to an explanation of 
p qua an explanation of p that it fails to explain something else. That there are 
features of moral knowledge that remain puzzling after an explanation of 
knowledge of a particular moral fact is given is to be expected.
However, one might think that the real challenge for moral epistemology 
is the task of explaining the possibility of moral knowledge – this is what 
philosophers have been interested in all along. I believe that the explanations 
I proposed may help us to make some headway towards addressing this 
challenge as well. If we have adequate explanations of instances of moral 
knowledge we may be able to explain the possibility of moral knowledge “bot-
tom-up”. If we can properly explain Jane’s knowledge that A is right in many 
different situations, what aspect of the possibility of moral knowledge is left 
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unexplained? Certainly we haven’t identified the mechanism by which moral 
knowledge is obtained and it may be quite interesting to try to learn more 
about this mechanism (or mechanisms). But if there is no puzzle about 
instances of moral knowledge, questions about the possibility of moral knowl-
edge may seem less pressing and more manageable.
This leads us to a fifth and related reason why the kinds of explanations 
I proposed have not generally been considered: the “bottom-up” explanation 
of the possibility of moral knowledge seems to beg the question against 
the sceptic. In framing the issue in terms of explanations of knowledge of 
particular moral facts we helped ourselves to the explanandum—namely, that 
in those instances we are addressing the agent in question does have moral 
knowledge. When one attempts to explain something, one presupposes the 
truth of the explanandum at least for the duration of the explanation game. 
It is no surprise, then, that with this presupposition we are able to show that 
moral knowledge is possible because in effect we already assumed that it is 
possible.
It is certainly true that framing the issue in terms of explaining knowledge 
of particular moral facts we presuppose that such knowledge is possible and to 
that extent framing the debate in this way begs the question against the scep-
tic. However, one is unlikely to respond successfully to the sceptical challenge 
if one accepts the sceptic’s terms. Framing the debate in terms of explanation 
may help us to endorse a perspective from which the sceptic’s terms no longer 
seem attractive. The proposal is not meant to resolve the sceptical challenge 
but rather to dissolve it by offering a framework in which it is sensible to resist 
the sceptic’s terms.
So while we can understand why explanations of the kind I proposed have 
been overlooked, I conclude that none of the reasons considered here war-
rants dismissing such explanations as inadequate explanations of knowledge 
of particular moral fact. Moreover, taking such explanations at face value may 
help us to circumvent sceptical challenges to moral knowledge.
4 Conclusion
I hope to have shown that moral epistemology does not pose a special problem 
for the particularist research programme. I considered two arguments that 
purport to show that exceptionless moral principles are essential for adequate 
explanations of moral knowledge, and I claimed that both arguments are 
unpersuasive. In “normal” contexts, I argued, particularist-friendly explana-
tions of moral knowledge of particular facts are not so difficult to come by. 
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Moreover, I’ve suggested that if we have adequate explanations of particular 
instances of moral knowledge, we might also (indirectly) have an explanation 
of the possibility of moral knowledge. This “bottom-up” approach to moral 
epistemology is unlikely to appease the sceptic. Nevertheless it may help us 
dissolve the problem of moral scepticism by making it easier for us to resist the 
conditions of adequacy for explanations of the possibility of moral knowledge 
on which the sceptic insists.
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